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boundary/internal/servers/worker/handler.go

160 lines
4.9 KiB

package worker
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/internalshared/configutil"
"github.com/hashicorp/watchtower/globals"
)
type HandlerProperties struct {
ListenerConfig *configutil.Listener
}
// Handler returns an http.Handler for the API. This can be used on
// its own to mount the Vault API within another web server.
func (c *Worker) Handler(props HandlerProperties) http.Handler {
// Create the muxer to handle the actual endpoints
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.Handle("/v1/", handleDummy())
genericWrappedHandler := c.wrapGenericHandler(mux, props)
return genericWrappedHandler
}
func handleDummy() http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.Write([]byte(`{"foo": "bar"}`))
})
}
func (c *Worker) wrapGenericHandler(h http.Handler, props HandlerProperties) http.Handler {
var maxRequestDuration time.Duration
var maxRequestSize int64
if props.ListenerConfig != nil {
maxRequestDuration = props.ListenerConfig.MaxRequestDuration
maxRequestSize = props.ListenerConfig.MaxRequestSize
}
if maxRequestDuration == 0 {
maxRequestDuration = globals.DefaultMaxRequestDuration
}
if maxRequestSize == 0 {
maxRequestSize = globals.DefaultMaxRequestSize
}
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Set the Cache-Control header for all responses returned
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
// Start with the request context
ctx := r.Context()
var cancelFunc context.CancelFunc
// Add our timeout
ctx, cancelFunc = context.WithTimeout(ctx, maxRequestDuration)
// Add a size limiter if desired
if maxRequestSize > 0 {
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, "max_request_size", maxRequestSize)
}
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, "original_request_path", r.URL.Path)
r = r.WithContext(ctx)
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
cancelFunc()
return
})
}
/*
func WrapForwardedForHandler(h http.Handler, authorizedAddrs []*sockaddr.SockAddrMarshaler, rejectNotPresent, rejectNonAuthz bool, hopSkips int) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
headers, headersOK := r.Header[textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey("X-Forwarded-For")]
if !headersOK || len(headers) == 0 {
if !rejectNotPresent {
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("missing x-forwarded-for header and configured to reject when not present"))
return
}
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
// If not rejecting treat it like we just don't have a valid
// header because we can't do a comparison against an address we
// can't understand
if !rejectNotPresent {
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errwrap.Wrapf("error parsing client hostport: {{err}}", err))
return
}
addr, err := sockaddr.NewIPAddr(host)
if err != nil {
// We treat this the same as the case above
if !rejectNotPresent {
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errwrap.Wrapf("error parsing client address: {{err}}", err))
return
}
var found bool
for _, authz := range authorizedAddrs {
if authz.Contains(addr) {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
// If we didn't find it and aren't configured to reject, simply
// don't trust it
if !rejectNonAuthz {
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("client address not authorized for x-forwarded-for and configured to reject connection"))
return
}
// At this point we have at least one value and it's authorized
// Split comma separated ones, which are common. This brings it in line
// to the multiple-header case.
var acc []string
for _, header := range headers {
vals := strings.Split(header, ",")
for _, v := range vals {
acc = append(acc, strings.TrimSpace(v))
}
}
indexToUse := len(acc) - 1 - hopSkips
if indexToUse < 0 {
// This is likely an error in either configuration or other
// infrastructure. We could either deny the request, or we
// could simply not trust the value. Denying the request is
// "safer" since if this logic is configured at all there may
// be an assumption it can always be trusted. Given that we can
// deny accepting the request at all if it's not from an
// authorized address, if we're at this point the address is
// authorized (or we've turned off explicit rejection) and we
// should assume that what comes in should be properly
// formatted.
respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("malformed x-forwarded-for configuration or request, hops to skip (%d) would skip before earliest chain link (chain length %d)", hopSkips, len(headers)))
return
}
r.RemoteAddr = net.JoinHostPort(acc[indexToUse], port)
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
})
}
*/