From e07503add4fd0f72808aedef1d8442fcd562b0ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeff Mitchell <jeffrey.mitchell@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 09:29:31 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] Remove some long-standing commented code (#4242)

This actually was implemented elsewhere for eventing but the commented
code wasn't removed. We can finally be free.
---
 internal/daemon/controller/handler.go | 90 ---------------------------
 1 file changed, 90 deletions(-)

diff --git a/internal/daemon/controller/handler.go b/internal/daemon/controller/handler.go
index e6ce252de6..9d6f90d8e8 100644
--- a/internal/daemon/controller/handler.go
+++ b/internal/daemon/controller/handler.go
@@ -711,93 +711,3 @@ func wrapHandlerWithCallbackInterceptor(h http.Handler, c *Controller) http.Hand
 		h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
 	})
 }
-
-/*
-func WrapForwardedForHandler(h http.Handler, authorizedAddrs []*sockaddr.SockAddrMarshaler, rejectNotPresent, rejectNonAuthz bool, hopSkips int) http.Handler {
-	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		headers, headersOK := r.Header[textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey("X-Forwarded-For")]
-		if !headersOK || len(headers) == 0 {
-			if !rejectNotPresent {
-				h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
-				return
-			}
-			respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("missing x-forwarded-for header and configured to reject when not present"))
-			return
-		}
-
-		host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
-		if err != nil {
-			// If not rejecting treat it like we just don't have a valid
-			// header because we can't do a comparison against an address we
-			// can't understand
-			if !rejectNotPresent {
-				h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
-				return
-			}
-			respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errwrap.Wrapf("error parsing client hostport: {{err}}", err))
-			return
-		}
-
-		addr, err := sockaddr.NewIPAddr(host)
-		if err != nil {
-			// We treat this the same as the case above
-			if !rejectNotPresent {
-				h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
-				return
-			}
-			respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errwrap.Wrapf("error parsing client address: {{err}}", err))
-			return
-		}
-
-		var found bool
-		for _, authz := range authorizedAddrs {
-			if authz.Contains(addr) {
-				found = true
-				break
-			}
-		}
-		if !found {
-			// If we didn't find it and aren't configured to reject, simply
-			// don't trust it
-			if !rejectNonAuthz {
-				h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
-				return
-			}
-			respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("client address not authorized for x-forwarded-for and configured to reject connection"))
-			return
-		}
-
-		// At this point we have at least one value and it's authorized
-
-		// Split comma separated ones, which are common. This brings it in line
-		// to the multiple-header case.
-		var acc []string
-		for _, header := range headers {
-			vals := strings.Split(header, ",")
-			for _, v := range vals {
-				acc = append(acc, strings.TrimSpace(v))
-			}
-		}
-
-		indexToUse := len(acc) - 1 - hopSkips
-		if indexToUse < 0 {
-			// This is likely an error in either configuration or other
-			// infrastructure. We could either deny the request, or we
-			// could simply not trust the value. Denying the request is
-			// "safer" since if this logic is configured at all there may
-			// be an assumption it can always be trusted. Given that we can
-			// deny accepting the request at all if it's not from an
-			// authorized address, if we're at this point the address is
-			// authorized (or we've turned off explicit rejection) and we
-			// should assume that what comes in should be properly
-			// formatted.
-			respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("malformed x-forwarded-for configuration or request, hops to skip (%d) would skip before earliest chain link (chain length %d)", hopSkips, len(headers)))
-			return
-		}
-
-		r.RemoteAddr = net.JoinHostPort(acc[indexToUse], port)
-		h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
-		return
-	})
-}
-*/